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In response to a sharp increase in litigation challenging mergers, the
Delaware Chancery Court issued the 2016 Trulia decision, which substantively
reduced the attractiveness of Delaware as a forum for these suits. In this Article,
we empirically assess the response of plaintiffs’ attorneys to these developments.
Specifically, we document a troubling trend—the flight of merger litigation to
federal court where these cases are overwhelmingly resolved through voluntary
dismissals that provide no benefit to the plaintiff class but generate a payment
to plaintiffs’ counsel in the form of a mootness fee. In 2018, for example, 77% of
deals with litigation were challenged in federal court, and in 63% of litigated
cases, plaintiffs’ attorneys received a mootness fee. This compares with 2014,
when only 4% of deals with litigation had a filing in federal court and no
mootness fees were awarded.
The rise of the mootness fee and the shift to federal court raise several
issues, including a lack of transparency in the quality and resolution of merger
cases and an increased potential for blackmail litigation. These problems are
compounded by the willingness of some courts to permit the payment of a
mootness fee in connection with corrective disclosures that are immaterial but
possibly helpful, a standard that we argue is unworkable and increases the
potential for vexatious litigation. We argue that the widespread payment of
mootness fees reflects an inappropriate tax on the judicial system and
corporations.
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Although we argue that a shift to federal courts is appropriate for
litigation challenging the adequacy of merger disclosure, we maintain that a
successful shift requires the federal courts to police the quality and resolution
of merger litigation carefully. We conclude that federal courts should require
that the payment of mootness fees be subject to judicial review. We further argue
that the payment of a mootness fee should be conditioned on litigation resulting
in a material corrective disclosure—the same legal standard required by Trulia.
We propose that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be amended to implement
these requirements or alternatively that federal judges use their inherent
authority to adopt these requirements. We ultimately view these changes as
necessary to limit frivolous litigation and provide for transparency and judicial
oversight of the litigation process.
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INTRODUCTION
The recent history of merger litigation—shareholder lawsuits
challenging a merger—can best be described as schizophrenic.1 Starting
in 2009, merger litigation rates climbed markedly. At the peak, in 2013,
over 96% of publicly announced mergers were challenged in shareholder
litigation.2 During this time period, merger litigation also extended to
multiple jurisdictions, with the average deal in 2011 attracting five
lawsuits.3 Delaware courts attracted a substantial proportion of these
lawsuits; in 2015, 60% of all deals were challenged by a lawsuit filed in
the Delaware Chancery Court.4
This picture of merger litigation began to change about five
years ago. Issuers adopted forum selection bylaws to prevent plaintiffs
from filing litigation challenges in multiple states, and these bylaws
were upheld first by the Delaware courts5 and subsequently by the
legislature.6 The Delaware courts also responded in a series of decisions
restricting the scope of merger litigation both substantively and
procedurally.7
The decisions limiting the scope of merger litigation culminated
in In re Trulia Inc. Stockholder Litigation in 2016. In Trulia, the
Delaware Chancery Court held that the Delaware courts would no
longer approve merger litigation settlements that provided for a release
1.
We documented this trend in a prior article, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Steven
Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas, The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation, 71 VAND. L. REV.
603 (2018).
2.
Id. at 620. Private litigation is the dominant mechanism for challenging the price,
fairness, or disclosures in connection with a public company merger. Enforcement actions by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) have typically been limited to particular transaction
contexts such as reverse mergers and, even in such cases, are addressed exclusively to disclosure
issues. See, e.g., Paul Rodel, A Look at Market Trends in Reverse Mergers, LAW360 (Mar. 21, 2017,
2:05 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/904096/a-look-at-market-trends-in-reverse-mergers
[https://perma.cc/GT2T-GKK6] (describing SEC enforcement actions in several reverse merger
cases in 2011).
3.
Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2015, at 3 (Jan. 14,
2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2715890 [https://perma.cc/7SNJRSM6].
4.
Cain et al., supra note 1, at 621. This led to charges of widespread frivolous merger
litigation. See, e.g., Gregory A. Markel, Martin L. Seidel & Gillian G. Burns, Assessing a Judicial
Solution to Abusive Merger Litigation, LAW360 (Nov. 19, 2015, 9:59 AM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/728061/assessing-a-judicial-solution-to-abusive-mergerlitigation [https://perma.cc/F6GE-5H7D] (observing that “lawsuits are filed after virtually every
public merger is announced, in many cases with little regard to the merits of the claim”).
5.
Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 963 (Del. Ch. 2013).
6.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2019).
7.
See, e.g., Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 305–06 (Del. 2015) (holding
that the business judgment rule is “the appropriate standard of review for a post-closing damages
action when a merger that is not subject to the entire fairness standard of review has been
approved by a fully informed, uncoerced majority of the disinterested stockholders”).

1780

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:6:1777

and an award of attorneys’ fees if they did not achieve meaningful
benefits for shareholders.8 The Trulia court specifically rejected a
proposed settlement which offered to provide plaintiffs with additional
nonmaterial disclosures in exchange for a broad release and a fee award
to plaintiffs’ counsel.9 The court noted in dicta that, rather than
resolving merger litigation through a court-approved settlement and fee
award, the defendant could voluntarily make supplemental disclosures
in response to the plaintiffs’ challenge, rendering the case moot.10 Six
months later, in In re Xoom Corp. Stockholder Litigation, a Delaware
court awarded a $50,000 mootness fee.11 The Xoom court stated that the
Trulia requirement of materiality did not apply to mootness dismissals
and that “a [mootness] fee can be awarded if the disclosure provides
some benefit to stockholders, whether or not material to the vote.”12
These substantive changes in Delaware law, coupled with the
Trulia decision, reduced the attractiveness of merger litigation in
Delaware. Delaware’s crackdown did not put an end to merger
litigation, however. Instead, the changes resulted in the flight of merger
litigation filings from Delaware to the federal courts.13 These federal
suits repackaged state-law claims based on fiduciary duty into
antifraud actions under section 14A and Rule 14a-9 thereunder.14 By
2017, merger litigation rates, which had dipped to 74% of deals in 2016,
rose to 83%, but only 10% of litigated deals faced a challenge in

8.
In re Trulia Inc., Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 907–08 (Del. Ch. 2016). The Trulia
court found that, because the supplemental disclosures obtained by the plaintiffs in the settlement
were not material, they “provided no meaningful benefit to stockholders.” Id. at 899; see also
Transcript of Settlement Hearing and Rulings of the Court at 37, 40, Assad v. World Energy Sols.,
Inc., No. 10324-CB (Del. Ch. Aug. 20, 2015) (statement of Chancellor Bouchard):
[I]t should be pretty clear from some of the questions that I’m asking and some of the
recent hearings . . . that there is a lot of concern in this court about nonmonetary
settlements . . . there is going to be more scrutiny on some of the give and the get of
these things.
9.
Trulia, 129 A.3d at 907.
10. Id. at 897–98 (“The preferred scenario of a mootness dismissal appears to be catching
on.”).
11. No. 11263-VCG, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 117, at *14–15 (Del. Ch. Aug. 4, 2016).
12. Id. at *9–10.
13. Cain et al., supra note 1, at 631–32.
14. Federal court filings were consistent with the terms of issuer-adopted forum selection
bylaws. The shift to the federal courts was in line with a proposal made by two of the coauthors of
this article. See Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Confronting the
Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93
TEX. L. REV. 557, 562, 601 (2015) (arguing that merger disclosure challenges should be litigated
under federal securities laws rather than under Delaware law in order to reduce the frequency of
frivolous, disclosure-only settlements). But see Phillip R. Sumpter, Adjusting Attorneys’ Fee
Awards: The Delaware Court of Chancery’s Answer to Incentivizing Meritorious Disclosure-Only
Settlements, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 669, 675 (2013) (defending the value of disclosure-only settlements
in merger litigation).
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Delaware, while 87% faced one in federal court.15 By 2018, the numbers
were even more dramatic—5% of litigated deals were challenged in the
Delaware courts, and 92% gave rise to a federal court lawsuit.16
In prior work, we identified the shift to federal court and posited
that the change was due to Trulia and other Delaware decisions.17 We
document here an additional component of the shift to federal court: the
increased and distinctive use of mootness dismissals. Although some
commentators expected the move to federal court to result in greater
scrutiny of plaintiffs’ allegations of disclosure violations—scrutiny that
would result in the outright (and involuntary) dismissal of cases—that
outcome has not yet materialized.18 Almost all of the federal court
mootness dismissals take place without an adversarial process,
meaningful judicial oversight, or an evaluation of whether the
complaint even states a colorable claim.
Based on what we can ascertain from public filings, post-Trulia
cases filed in federal court are almost invariably terminated through a
voluntary dismissal coupled with the payment of a mootness fee to the
plaintiffs’ attorney.19 The mootness fee, which is typically in the range
of $50,000 to $300,000, is purportedly compensation to the plaintiffs’
attorneys for obtaining supplemental disclosures in the proxy

15. Infra Table 1. The percentages do not sum to 100% because of multiple cases in multiple
forums.
16. Infra Table 1.
17. See Cain et al., supra note 1.
18. Fisch et al., supra note 14, at 601–02.
19. See also Jack B. Jacobs, Andrew W. Stern & Jon W. Muenz, ‘Mootness Fees’ in Deal
Litigation: An Argument for a Different Approach, BLOOMBERG L. 1 (Mar. 28, 2017),
https://www.sidley.com/-/media/publications/bloomberg-bna-corporate-counsel-weekly_mootnessfees-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PSB-TH6Y] (“Delaware courts have facilitated, if not encouraged,
such fee applications by applying a standard more lenient than that applied in the context of a
disclosure-only settlement fee application: the disclosure need only be ‘helpful’ to class members.”).
In addition, the court has expressed a preference for resolving disclosure-only cases through
dismissal and a mootness fee application even when the corrective disclosures meet the “plainly
material” standard of Trulia. See In re BTU Int’l Stockholders Litig., No. 10310-CB, 2016 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 212, at *4 (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2016); In re Trulia Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898
(Del. Ch. 2016) (“In using the term ‘plainly material,’ I mean that it should not be a close call that
the supplemental information is material as that term is defined under Delaware law.”).
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statement.20 Most federal courts do not review the request for dismissal
or the proposed mootness fee payment.21
We begin this Article in Part I by conducting an empirical
analysis documenting the scope and pervasiveness of the mootness
fee.22 We find that in 2018, 92% of completed deal cases were brought
in federal court. In that same year, in at least 63% of litigated cases,
plaintiffs’ attorneys received a mootness fee.23 Notably, mootness fees
appear to have displaced formal settlements (coupled with releases)
entirely in federal court litigation. As of January 2019, not a single case
initiated in 2018 had resulted in a judgment or settlement—all of the
dispositions as of that date have been either dismissals with the
payment of mootness fees or outright dismissals.24 We also document a
marked shift away from the Delaware courts. Plaintiffs’ attorneys are
overwhelmingly bringing litigation challenges to mergers in other state
courts and federal court.
The rise of the mootness fee and the shift in merger litigation
raise several issues, which we take up in Part II. We begin by
considering the resolution of cases through corrective disclosure and a
mootness fee as an alternative to a court-approved settlement. This
development implicates several questions, including the quality of the
mootness fee cases, the lack of transparency with respect to the size of
the mootness fee, and, even in cases in which courts review the
mootness fee, their limited ability to bring meaningful scrutiny to bear
on the process by evaluating the quality of the supplemental
disclosures. Notably, we observe that merger litigation is primarily
20. See Rosenfeld v. Time, Inc., No. 17cv9886 (DLC), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148394, at *2–3
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2018) (“Sometimes these settlements are characterized as ‘mootness fees,’ in
which the corporation moots the lawsuit by making the allegedly withheld disclosures, and pays
plaintiffs’ counsel a ‘voluntary’ fee in return.”); see also Joseph M. McLaughlin & Shannon K.
McGovern, Mootness Fees in Disclosure-Focused Deal Litigation, N.Y.L.J. (Dec. 12, 2018, 2:46 PM),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/12/12/mootness-fees-in-disclosure-focused-deallitigation/ [https://perma.cc/2RML-Q7GK] (reporting that “[m]ore recently, median mootness fees
are closer to $250,000”).
21. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) only requires court approval of a voluntary dismissal after class
certification.
22. Our empirical analysis in this Article examines a dataset of merger litigation for deals
over $100 million completed from 2003 through 2018. We limit our analysis to larger transactions,
as do many similar studies, because larger deals are more likely to attract interest from the
plaintiffs’ bar. See, e.g., Elliot J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How
Delaware Law (Mis)Shapes Shareholder Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1823 n.87 (2004)
(employing similar approach).
23. As we explain more fully infra note 41, we are limited in determining the full number of
mootness fee payments because they are not always disclosed by the parties.
24. We note that the absence of fully adjudicated cases could just be the product of larger
deals now being subject to a higher quality process such that the disclosures and procedures
involved do not give rise to potential liability. This result, however, is in tension with the high
percentage of deals that continue to be the subject of litigation. See infra Table 1.
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brought in federal court by a small subset of plaintiffs’ law firms. Top
plaintiffs’ firms, which have been documented in other research as
consistently obtaining superior monetary settlements for shareholders,
are not active in filing these cases.25 This suggests the possibility that
these suits are not being filed with the expectation of obtaining a
meaningful recovery for the plaintiff class but rather in order to obtain
a quick disclosure and mootness fee, a practice that Judge Denise Cote
of the Southern District of New York describes as conferring “no or little
appreciable benefit” on target company shareholders.26
We consider the challenge faced by the court in evaluating these
disclosures in the context of an application for mootness fees. Although
commentators have criticized the current materiality standard as
providing insufficient guidance, we argue that the lesser standards
applied by some courts in connection with the evaluation of a mootness
fee (such as whether the supplemental disclosures are “helpful” or “of
some value”) provide even less guidance and invite abusive litigation
filed solely for the purpose of extracting a nominal fee payment.27 To
the extent that mootness fees are paid in such cases, they are an
inappropriate tax on the judicial system. Mootness fees and the
accompanying litigation not only impose costs, they also do not appear
to provide appreciable benefits to shareholders.
A related and potentially more problematic issue is the
negotiation and payment of mootness fees outside the judicial process.
Although Delaware law requires disclosure and judicial review of
mootness dismissals,28 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”)
do not explicitly mandate either notice to the shareholders or court
approval when merger suits are voluntarily dismissed prior to class
certification. The shift to federal court appears to be an attempt to
leverage this potential gap in judicial oversight.
We argue in Part III that the shift of merger litigation to federal
court is appropriate and that federal rather than state disclosure law
should set the legal standard for the required disclosures in merger and
tender offer cases. We maintain, however, that a successful shift
25. C.N.V. Krishnan et al., Who Are the Top Law Firms? Assessing the Value of Plaintiffs’
Law Firms in Merger Litigation, 18 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 122, 124 (2016) (“[T]he top 5 firms, on
average, have anywhere between around 5 and 10% each of total market share every sample
year.”).
26. Rosenfeld v. Time Inc., No. 17cv9886 (DLC), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148394, at *12
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2018).
27. See, e.g., In re Xoom Corp. Stockholder Litig., No. 11263-VCG, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 117,
at *10 (Aug. 4, 2016) (awarding a $50,000 mootness fee after concluding that a disclosure that was
merely “helpful” could justify a fee award in the context of a voluntary dismissal rather than a
settlement).
28. See infra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.
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requires the federal courts to police the quality and resolution of merger
litigation carefully. Given the public interests involved and the nature
of plaintiffs’ attorneys as quasi representatives of all shareholders,
federal courts should require that mootness fees be submitted to the
court and be subject to meaningful judicial oversight. We further argue
that the payment of a mootness fee should be conditioned on litigation
resulting in a material corrective disclosure—the same legal standard
as required by Trulia. We believe that both requirements are consistent
with the purpose of both the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(“PSLRA”),29 which is to limit frivolous litigation, and FRCP 23, which
provides for transparency and judicial oversight of the class action
process.
I. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
To provide the reader with a deeper understanding of mootness
fees and their prevalence today, we begin in this Section by presenting
the results of an empirical analysis of the changing patterns of merger
and acquisition (“M&A”) deal litigation over time. We construct a large
sample of cases, then use our data to explore the number of case filings
by year, the outcomes of those cases, the shift in case filings to federal
court, the plaintiffs’ law firms that are bringing these cases, and the
increasing resolution of these cases through voluntary dismissals
coupled with the payment of mootness fees.
A. Data Set
For our analysis, we used a sample that includes 2,320 unique
deals. We constructed our sample from the transactions included in the
FactSet MergerMetrics database.30 These transactions were announced
between 2003 and 2018 and met all of the five following criteria: (1) the
target was a publicly traded U.S. firm, (2) the deal size was at least
$100 million, (3) the offer price was at least $5 per share, (4) a merger
agreement was signed and publicly disclosed through a filing with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and (5) the transaction
was completed as of January 2019.
29. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
30. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State
Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 486 n.102 (2015) (explaining that
“MergerMetrics is a database of M&A data which offers ‘[i]n-depth research on mergers involving
US public targets.’ ” (quoting FACTSET MERGERS, http://www.mergermetrics.com (last visited Oct.
31, 2014))); see also FACTSET MERGERS https://www.mergermetrics.com (last visited Nov. 6, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/7U34-82CR] for more information about the data set.
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Completed deals during our sample period ranged from a low of
58 in 2009 to a high of 287 in 2007.33 We observed a post-financial crisis
high in 2016 and 2017, with 172 and 174 completed deals, respectively.
The number of deal lawsuits filed peaked in 2017 at 144, with a low of
44 in 2009.
The first two columns of Table 1 provide data on the number of
completed deals and the percentage of those deals with completed
shareholder litigation. The percentage of deals with completed
litigation fluctuated substantially over our sample period. Initially,
during the period from 2003 to 2008, litigation rates ranged from 33%
to 43% of completed deals. This changed dramatically after the financial
crisis, rising to 76% in 2009 and then to 90% and higher between 2010
and 2015. Litigation rates peaked in 2013 at 96% of all completed deals
and then declined to 83% of deals in 2017 and 2018.
These movements in the overall litigation rates for completed
deals were accompanied by some dramatic shifts in the venues for deal
litigation. For the period from 2003 to 2018, Table 1 also presents data
on venues for deal case filings. The middle three columns break out
these filings into three important categories: Delaware, other states,
and the federal courts. These filing percentages do not sum to 100%
because almost every deal can be challenged by a lawsuit in Delaware,
a lawsuit in another state where the headquarters of the target
company is located, and a lawsuit in federal court. The final column
details the average number of suits filed per deal.

33. We have only forty-one deals in our sample in 2003, which underestimates the number
for the full year because MergerMetrics coverage began in 2003 with only partial coverage in that
year.
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TABLE 1: FILINGS BY DEAL COMPLETION YEAR
Deals
with
Other
Deals Litigation Delaware* States*
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
Total

41
140
159
210
287
152
58
134
131
121
120
117
147
172
174
157
2,320

34%
33%
37%
39%
42%
43%
76%
90%
92%
90%
96%
91%
89%
74%
83%
83%
66%

7%
43%
39%
21%
28%
23%
34%
49%
50%
56%
52%
55%
60%
34%
10%
5%
37%

100%
78%
66%
82%
86%
92%
98%
88%
88%
88%
83%
73%
51%
62%
19%
18%
68%

Mean #
of Suits
Filed per
Federal*
Deal
7%
0%
7%
12%
13%
21%
20%
26%
40%
34%
32%
15%
19%
37%
87%
92%
35%

1.6
2.7
2.3
2.3
3.2
2.9
3.8
4.5
5.4
5.1
4.8
4.5
4.2
3.4
2.5
2.7
3.7

*Percentages sum to greater than 100% each year due to multi-jurisdictional
filings.

We begin by focusing on Delaware because the majority of public
corporations are incorporated in Delaware and the Delaware Chancery
Court is well-known for its expertise in corporate law issues. This
makes Delaware an available venue for most deal cases, although, as
the data show, its popularity among plaintiffs’ lawyers as a filing choice
fluctuated substantially over our sample period. Roughly speaking,
Delaware filings prior to 2009 ranged in the area of 30–40% of all
completed deals, with a short-lived dip in 2006–2008.34 After 2010, as
the percentage of deals with litigation jumped into the 90% region,
Delaware filing percentages also shot up into the 50–60% area, where

34. This decline was attributed to plaintiffs’ lawyers filing suit outside of Delaware to seek
better outcomes and created a concern that Delaware was “losing its cases.” John Armour, Bernard
Black & Brian Cheffins, Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 605, 607
(2012).
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they remained until 2015.35 By 2016, Delaware litigation rates, perhaps
in response to Trulia, fell by almost 50%. This downward trend
continued in 2017, falling to 10% of completed deals, and dropped even
further in 2018 to 5% of completed deals. Without a question, the
changes in Delaware law have effectively closed the courthouse doors
to a tiny crack for deal litigation.36
Where have the cases gone? If we look first at the data on “Other
States,” the filing trends differ from what happened in Delaware.
Initially, from 2004 to 2007, litigation rates varied from 66% to 86%,
with an upward trend over the years 2008 and 2009, flattening out at
88% in 2010–2012. At that point, we started to see a decline in litigation
rates, probably because of the adoption of forum selection bylaws
beginning in 2013 and accelerating after the Boilermakers Local 154
Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp. decision.37 This decline became
precipitous in 2017–2018, when litigation rates in other states fell to
18–19% of all completed deals. As with Delaware, plaintiffs’ lawyers are
reducing their filings in other state courts, a trend that likely resulted
from the increasing prevalence of forum selection bylaws. As before, we
are left with the question: Where are all the deal cases going?
The answer to that query appears when we look at the federal
courts. Federal court filings were relatively small potatoes compared to
those in Delaware and other states during the period from 2003 to 2009,
constituting roughly 10–20% of filings. As the percentage of deals with
litigation escalated in 2010, there was a corresponding increase in
federal court litigation rates into the 30–40% range, but this tapered off
into the high teens in 2014–2015. As Delaware clamped down on deal
litigation in 2016 and forum selection bylaws began to limit the ability
of plaintiffs to file in other state courts, filings shifted noticeably to
federal courts, a shift that is not generally prevented by forum selection
bylaws. This was followed by a flood of federal case filings in 2017 and
a peak in 2018, with 92% of deal cases filed in federal court.
35. Only 65% of the deals in the sample involve targets incorporated or headquartered in
Delaware. Practically speaking, this means that the percentage of Delaware filings cannot exceed
65% and thus the 2015 60% filing rate is near the maximum litigation rate possible for Delaware.
36. For 2017–2018, we found only six cases that were filed only in Delaware, while there were
an additional eighteen cases that were filed in both Delaware and other state courts.
37. 73 A.3d 934, 963 (Del. Ch. 2013) (upholding a Delaware-incorporated company’s adoption
of a forum selection bylaw selecting Delaware as the situs for all state fiduciary duty litigation).
In the wake of Boilermakers, Delaware firms moved quickly to adopt these types of bylaws. See
Joseph A. Grundfest, The History and Evolution Of Intra-Corporate Forum Selection Clauses: An
Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 333, 358–59 (2012) (documenting acceleration in the
adoption of forum selection bylaws post-Boilermakers); Roberta Romano & Sarath Sanga, The
Private Ordering Solution to Multiforum Shareholder Litigation, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 31,
33 (2017) (finding that as of 2014, the number of Delaware firms adopting forum selection bylaws
was 746).

2019]

MOOTNESS FEES

1789

The final column of Table 1 shows that the mean number of suits
filed per transaction has returned to pre–financial crisis levels. Prior to
2009, this value ran from a low of 1.6 suits per litigated deal in 2003 to
a high of 3.2 such suits. When deal litigation rates hit the 92% level in
2011, the mean number of suits filed per litigated deal shot up to 5.4
and continued to remain elevated until 2017, when it dropped to 2.5
suits per litigated deal, indicating a decline in litigation intensity.38
We turn next to litigation outcomes. Table 2 examines litigation
settlements from 2003 to 2018. The first column represents the total
number of deals with litigation for which we were able to determine how
that litigation was resolved, using court documents, media reports, or
other public sources. The second and third columns display the
percentages of cases with known outcomes that settled or were
dismissed.

38. As we noted in our earlier work, the number of suits filed per litigated deal was previously
a good indicator of plaintiffs’ law firms’ interest in merger litigation and a solid measure of these
attorneys’ “belief in their ability to bring cases that are sufficiently successful to warrant a
reasonable fee award, either on the merits or through a settlement.” Cain et al., supra note 1, at
629. With the increasing adoption of forum selection bylaws, this measure has become less
meaningful.
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TABLE 2: LITIGATION OUTCOMES BY DEAL COMPLETION YEAR

N
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

11
44
56
78
109
65
41
110
110
102
109
104
124
111
135
120

Settlements
Mootness
that Were
Settled Dismissed
Fees
Disclosure Only
55%
66%
54%
71%
68%
69%
73%
82%
80%
77%
77%
63%
46%
41%
9%
0%

45%
34%
46%
29%
32%
31%
27%
18%
20%
23%
23%
38%
54%
59%
91%
100%

0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
1%
0%
3%
14%
20%
65%
63%

83%
41%
63%
58%
68%
82%
90%
79%
69%
85%
76%
75%
87%
93%
92%
N/A

Settlement and dismissal percentages show quite a bit of
movement over the sample period. During the early years (2003–2005),
settlements tracked in the 55–65% range, which means that dismissals
ran from 35–45% since the two numbers must sum to 100% for all of
these cases.39 Settlement percentages rose to a higher level from 2006
to 2013, running from a low of 68% to a high of 82%, before trending
downward in 2014 (63%), 2015 (46%), and 2016 (41%), then dropping
like a rock in 2017 to 9% and literally disappearing in 2018.40

39. There is only one case in our database which resulted in a verdict after trial, the case of
In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litigation, 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014), which resulted in a
judgment of $75.8 million against a defendant investment bank. See In re Rural/Metro Corp.
Stockholders Litig., 102 A.3d 205, 213 (Del Ch. 2014). There was a related settlement of $11.6
million in this case against other parties. See id. at 223. We classify this total amount as a
settlement for purposes of our data analysis. We discuss the Rural Metro case infra at notes 93–
95 and accompanying text.
40. It is important to remember that we are reporting only completed deals with litigation as
a known outcome. There were fifty-nine deals in our sample that had yet to be completed when we
finalized our coding in January 2019. In addition, even for completed deals, unresolved litigation
and settlement numbers trail case filings because of the delays associated with litigation. This is
particularly true for trials or settlements providing monetary damages. As a result, for recent
years, settlements are likely to be underrepresented in our data.
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As noted above, merger cases are increasingly terminated
through voluntary dismissals coupled with the payment of a mootness
fee rather than through court-approved settlements. As a result, some
of the dismissals in our data included the payment of a mootness fee by
the defendants.41 The rising use of mootness fees is documented in the
fourth column of Table 2. The payment of mootness fees was virtually
nonexistent prior to 2014, but then began rising in the wake of Trulia.
By 2015, mootness fees were paid in 14% of litigated cases, increasing
to 20% of cases in 2016. In 2017, mootness fees were paid in 65% of
litigated cases, and this practice continued at a similar level in 2018.
The widespread payment of mootness fees and accompanying case
dismissals reflects the adaptive litigation strategy of plaintiffs’ lawyers
to Trulia.42
The final column in Table 2 reports the percentage of disclosureonly settlements. In recent years these settlements became widespread,
reaching 93% of all settlements in 2016. This reflects the general
demise of other types of settlements, such as, for example, amendment
settlements, where the parties agree to a change in the terms of the
merger agreement.43 Disclosure-only settlements are disfavored in
Delaware after Trulia but could still have some lingering life in federal
court.44
Figure 2 graphically illustrates the sharp decline in settlement
outcomes over recent years, along with the corresponding rise in
mootness fees during the same time.

41. The presence of a mootness fee payment is frequently disclosed by the parties, although
the amount of the fee paid is usually not disclosed. As a result, the figures in Table 2 for mootness
fee payments should be regarded as a lower bound estimate for the number of cases in which such
fees are actually paid. Our metric for determining whether a mootness fee was paid was thus
(1) whether there was a specific disclosure related to a mootness fee, even if the fee was not
disclosed; or (2) whether there were indicia that a mootness fee was paid, such as a supplemental
disclosure which referred to a mootness issue.
42. For additional discussion, see Richard L. Renck, Court of Chancery Critically Reviewing
“Mootness” Fee Applications, MONDAQ, http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/518244/Civil+Law/
Court+of+Chancery+Critically+Reviewing+Mootness+Fee+Applications (last updated Aug. 11,
2016) [https://perma.cc/U3K8-S7MQ] (describing recent decisions evaluating mootness fee
applications).
43. See Fisch et al., supra note 14, at 576 (describing amendment settlements).
44. In In re Walgreen Co. Shareholder Litigation, 832 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2016), the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit adopted the Trulia standard for review of disclosure-only
settlements. However, it remains to be seen whether the other federal circuits will follow. To date,
all federal courts to have considered the issue have followed the Trulia standard, though not all
state courts have. See discussion infra notes 65–67 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 3: MERGER CASES IN FEDERAL COURTS BY DEAL COMPLETION
Federal
Federal SettleSuits
ments
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
Total

1
0
4
10
15
14
9
31
49
37
37
16
25
47
125
120
540

0
0
2
3
0
0
0
3
1
6
6
5
10
14
5
0
55

All Settled Mootness Mootness
NonCases in Fees Paid Fees Paid disclosure
Federal in Federal in Federal SettleCourts
Courts
Courts
ments
0%
0%
6%
6%
0%
0%
0%
3%
1%
8%
8%
8%
14%
30%
45%
N/A
7%

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
10
84
70
164

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
0%
0%
67%
99%
92%
92%

N/A
N/A
50%
0%
N/A
N/A
N/A
33%
100%
33%
17%
20%
0%
0%
0%
N/A
13%

The fourth and fifth columns of Table 3 show that many of the
dismissals in 2016–2018 resulted in the payment of mootness fees.46 For
example, in 2016, ten federal cases resulted in the payment of mootness
fees, which constituted 67% of the total number of mootness fee
payment cases. In 2017, both these numbers increased, with the
number of federal mootness cases rising to eighty-four and the
percentage of the total number of all mootness fee cases going up to
99%. Slightly lower, but still elevated, values of these variables were
recorded in 2018. Meanwhile, as shown in the last column,
nondisclosure settlements, which had once been relatively common in
federal cases, completely disappeared.47

46. See supra note 41 for a discussion of how we determined the presence of a mootness fee.
47. All the federal court cases settled in 2015 through 2017 were disclosure-only settlements.
This is not surprising; filings in federal court usually allege a disclosure violation under section
14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as a basis for jurisdiction, even if they also include
pendent state law claims. Moreover, a federal court that dismisses a disclosure claim can choose
not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law fiduciary duty claims.
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In Table 4, we examine the prevalence of multi-jurisdictional
litigation in M&A cases from 2013 to 2018. The first column shows the
frequency with which plaintiffs filed their class action litigation in state
courts other than the Delaware Chancery Court. From 2013 to 2016,
about 27% to 35% of all complaints filed were filed in these other state
courts. By 2017, as the impact of forum selection bylaws and Trulia
became apparent, the filing percentages dropped precipitously to 10%.
The same pattern is apparent in Delaware-only cases. In the
fourth column, we show cases that have been filed only in Delaware.
While the range in 2013–2016 was wider than that for the other states’
data, the sharp decline in 2017–2018 was even more pronounced. Even
if we include the cases filed in both Delaware and any other court
(shown in the third column), by 2018, only 6% of all complaints were
filed in Delaware Chancery Court (4% plus 2%).48
TABLE 4: WHERE ARE DEAL CASES BEING FILED?

2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

Other
States

Federal
+ Other
State

27%
34%
28%
35%
10%
7%

16%
7%
6%
17%
7%
11%

Delaware
+ Other
State/
Delaware
Federal
Only
Federal
42%
33%
21%
13%
8%
4%

10%
22%
39%
20%
3%
2%

5%
4%
5%
13%
72%
77%

Total
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%

The federal court data show the opposite trend. Prior to 2016, a
relatively small percentage of cases were filed exclusively in federal
court. This changed drastically in 2017, as the percentage of all deal
complaints filed only in federal court soared to over 70%. This trend
toward filing in federal court is further heightened if we add the filings
that were made in both federal court and other state courts, shown in
the second column.
Figure 3 illustrates these shifts graphically. The solid area
across the top in 2017 and 2018 shows that the shift into federal courts
has swamped all other venues.

48. This differs slightly from the rate shown in Table 1 due to rounding.
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TABLE 5: CASE FILINGS BY INCORPORATION
Panel A: Delaware-Incorporated Targets
Other
States

Federal + Delaware +
Other
Other State/ Delaware
State
Federal
Only

2013
13%
6%
62%
16%
2014
13%
0%
50%
34%
2015
8%
2%
31%
57%
2016
23%
12%
19%
31%
2017
5%
4%
11%
4%
2018
4%
6%
6%
2%
Panel B: Non–Delaware-Incorporated Targets
Other
States

Federal + Delaware +
Other
Other State/ Delaware
State
Federal
Only

2013
55%
34%
0%
0%
2014
73%
22%
0%
0%
2015
68%
14%
2%
2%
2016
60%
28%
2%
0%
2017
21%
13%
0%
0%
2018
12%
18%
0%
0%
Panel C: Case Outcomes by State of Incorporation
Delaware-Incorporated
Settled Dismissed
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

74%
57%
34%
29%
3%
0%

26%
43%
66%
71%
97%
100%

Mootness
Fees*
0%
3%
20%
27%
73%
64%

Federal

Total

3%
3%
1%
15%
75%
82%

100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%

Federal

Total

11%
5%
14%
9%
66%
69%

100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%

Non–Delaware-Incorporated
Settled

Dismissed

84%
74%
72%
71%
20%
0%

16%
26%
28%
29%
80%
100%

Mootness
Fees*
0%
3%
0%
3%
50%
63%

*Mootness fees are paid only in cases classified as “dismissed.”

Panel C demonstrates the remarkably sharp upward trend in
the payment of mootness fees. As discussed above, these fees were
relatively rare prior to 2015. The change appears to stem from
Chancellor Bouchard’s decision in Trulia, which implicitly gave judicial
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approval to the practice.49 For Delaware-incorporated firms, resolution
of litigation by means of a voluntary dismissal coupled with the
payment of a mootness fee rose from 20% of all cases in 2015 to a high
of 73% of these cases in 2017, before dropping slightly to 64% of cases
in 2018. Cases involving non-Delaware corporations demonstrated a
slightly slower shift to mootness fees; the rise began in earnest in 2017
and has just recently reached the same level as for Delaware
corporations.50
To gain more insight into which deal litigation is still being filed
only in the Delaware Chancery Court, in untabulated data, we broke
out the completed transaction merger cases for 2017 and 2018 and
examined their characteristics. For the six cases that were filed solely
in Delaware during that time period, four of them challenged goingprivate transactions or management buyouts (“MBOs”), which are
generally viewed as deals with potential conflicts of interest, meaning
they potentially have greater value for plaintiffs. One of these cases
settled with a substantial increase in the deal price paid to the
shareholders, four others were dismissed (three had mootness fee
payments), and one case is still pending. Based on this limited set of
observations, it appears that plaintiffs are still willing to file higherquality deal cases in Delaware.
Table 6 reports data about the ten plaintiffs’ law firms that filed
the most federal court merger cases in 2017, 2018 and January of 2019.
The first column shows the names of the law firms, while the second
displays the number of deals that they challenged by filing a federal
lawsuit. The total number of completed deals with federal lawsuits is
250. Market share is defined as the number of cases filed by the
particular law firm divided by the total number of deals, or the first
column divided by 250. The number of deals sums to more than 250,
and the percentages of market share sum to more than 100%, because
multiple law firms frequently file suit in connection with a given deal.
The third and fourth columns provide data on the percentage of each
firm’s cases that were dismissed, and the percentage of each firm’s cases
in which a mootness fee was paid, respectively. The final column lists
the percentage of the firm’s cases that settled.

49. See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 897 (Del. Ch. 2016) (describing the
payment of mootness fees as a “preferred scenario”).
50. The figures in Table 5 do not take into account pending litigation that will be settled or
dismissed at a later date. They therefore understate ultimate settlement figures and dismissal
percentages for litigation brought in the last few years. For further discussion of this issue, see
supra note 40.
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TABLE 6: PLAINTIFFS’ LAW FIRM RANKINGS IN FILING FEDERAL
MERGER LAWSUITS

Law Firm

Cases
Cases
Dismissed
Dismissed
with
Market Without Mootness
Deals Share51
Fees
Fees

Cases
Settled

Rigrodsky & Long

149

60%

30%

68%

1%

RM Law

119

48%

34%

65%

2%

Levi & Korsinsky

78

31%

23%

76%

1%

Faruqi & Faruqi

56

22%

25%

71%

4%

Monteverde &
Associates

45

18%

16%

80%

4%

WeissLaw

50

20%

30%

68%

2%

Brodsky Smith

22

9%

27%

73%

0%

15

6%

33%

67%

0%

12

5%

42%

58%

0%

12

5%

42%

58%

0%

O'Kelly Ernst &
Joyce, LLC
Kendall Law
Group
Matorin Law
Office
Total Cases

250

The six most active plaintiffs’ law firms in merger litigation filed
a disproportionate percentage of the federal cases. In fact, the top two
firms collectively filed 268 cases, which exceeds the total number of
completed deals in the sample with federal litigation during this period.
When we examined the filings of these two firms more closely, we found
that every single complaint filed by RM Law was in a deal that was also
being challenged by Rigrodsky & Long.52 The next four firms filed
51. Market Share is Number of Deals / Total Cases. Total Cases includes deals completed in
2017, 2018, and January 2019 with federal lawsuit filings. Number of Deals sums to more than
250 and Market Share sums to more than 100% since multiple firms may file on a given
transaction.
52. For purposes of filing merger litigation cases, the two firms appear to act on a coordinated
basis.
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another 229 federal merger lawsuits. Taken together, these six law
firms in total filed 497 federal lawsuits or almost two lawsuits per
completed deal.
Within the group, there was some variation in how frequently
the law firm was able to obtain a mootness fee. For example,
Monteverde & Associates had the highest percentage (80%) of cases in
which they obtained a mootness fee, while RM Law was only paid such
a fee in just under two-thirds of its cases (65%). Notably, each of these
law firms settled a very small percentage of their cases, ranging from
1% to 4% of the federal cases that they filed. Based on these data, we
conclude that these law firms appear to be more interested in collecting
mootness fees than in actively litigating the cases that they file.
To summarize our findings, there have been at least four
significant changes in merger litigation practice post-Trulia. First,
Delaware is no longer the center of this litigation; rather, the main
action has moved to federal court. Second, settlements have virtually
disappeared, and virtually all the cases are terminated by dismissals.
Third, most of the dismissals are voluntary and are accompanied by the
payment of a mootness fee; the percentage of dismissals coupled with
mootness fees has gone up significantly, especially for Delawareincorporated firms. Fourth, in 2017–2018, merger litigation was being
filed largely by six plaintiffs’ law firms, none of which were represented
among the top-tier plaintiffs’ firms who had been actively litigating (and
winning) deal cases in earlier years.53
II. ASSESSING MOOTNESS FEES
A. Resolution by Dismissal and Mootness Fee
In order to understand the significance of the shift in litigation,
we next examine the manner in which merger cases are currently being
resolved. Prior to Trulia, the standard resolution of a litigation
challenge to a deal was the rapid negotiation of a settlement between
the plaintiff class and the target company.54 The settlement typically
required the target to make supplemental disclosures in the proxy
statement, provided for a general release of all claims by the plaintiff

53. Krishnan et al., supra note 25, at 131–33 (naming “Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd,
Grant and Eisenhofer, Bernstein Litowitz Berger and Grossman, Milberg, and Kessler Topaz
Meltzer and Check” the top five plaintiffs’ firms from 2006–2012).
54. See, e.g., Fisch et al., supra note 14, at 466 (reporting that “nearly 70% of merger claims
settle while the rest are dismissed”).
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class, and sought a court-approved fee award to plaintiffs’ counsel.55 If
approved, the settlement bought the target peace from the prospect of
further litigation in exchange for the fee award, even though, as some
commentators have suggested, the value provided by the supplemental
disclosures to the plaintiff shareholders was questionable.56
In a prior article, Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in
Merger Litigation, two of the authors of this Article examined the value
of these types of settlements.57 The authors found that disclosure-only
settlements appeared, on average, to offer little value.58 More
particularly, these settlements, and the “corrective disclosures” they
entailed, did not significantly change the votes in merger transactions,
something that one might expect if the disclosures revealed material
information.59 In that article, the authors recommended that the
exclusive forum for these suits be federal court because issues of
materiality would both be highlighted in a complaint predicated on
section 14(a) and are within the core competence of the federal courts,
which are accustomed to dealing with questions involving the
materiality of alleged disclosure violations.60
The Trulia decision cited these findings in concluding that, in
light of the limited value of these disclosure-only settlements, the courts
should not routinely approve them.61 Instead, Trulia held that judicial
approval of a disclosure-only settlement was appropriate, if and only if,
the supplemental disclosures were “plainly material.”62 Disclosures
that did not meet that standard would not provide the plaintiff class
with sufficient consideration to justify a release of any potential
claims.63 On the facts in the Trulia case itself, the court determined that
the supplemental disclosures provided pursuant to the settlement were
neither material nor even helpful to the shareholders and therefore
refused to approve the proposed settlement.64
Outside of Delaware, courts have differed in the degree to which
they have accepted Trulia. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
55. Id. (explaining that “[t]he vast majority of suits, however, settle exclusively for
supplemental disclosure in the form of additional information in the merger proxy statement”).
56. See id. at 559–60 (describing scholarly skepticism of the value of disclosure-only
settlements).
57. See id.
58. Id. at 615.
59. See id. at 561 (reporting empirical findings that “disclosure-only settlements do not
appear to affect shareholder voting in any way”).
60. Id. at 595–96.
61. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 895 n.29 (Del. Ch. 2016).
62. Id. at 898.
63. Id. at 907.
64. Id.
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Circuit explicitly adopted Trulia’s “plainly material” standard,65 and
several federal district courts adopted Trulia as well.66 But not all
courts agreed. For example, in Gordon v. Verizon Communications, Inc.,
the New York First Department adopted a lesser standard of review,
concluding that approval of a proposed settlement was warranted
where the settlement conferred “some benefit” on the plaintiff class.67
The absence of a settlement and a release does not preclude the
possibility of a fee award for plaintiffs’ counsel. The Trulia court
recognized that, in a case in which the defendants voluntarily
supplement their disclosures in response to a litigation challenge,
thereby mooting the litigation, plaintiffs’ counsel can apply to the court
for a mootness fee.68 The Trulia court characterized this as the
“preferred scenario” because, in the absence of a settlement agreement,
defendants would have an incentive to oppose excessive fee awards, and
the court’s determination of an appropriate fee would have the benefit
of an adversarial process.69
Litigation in Delaware has developed in accordance with these
principles. In subsequent cases, the Delaware Chancery Court awarded
mootness fees under a more lenient legal standard than that required
by Trulia. As one commentator explained, in Delaware, “A mootness
process involves a company providing supplemental disclosures; the
plaintiff stockholders not providing a formal release of claims; and,
through an adversarial court proceeding, the parties litigating what fee
(if any) is appropriate for plaintiffs counsel for their having obtained
disclosure that ‘moots’ the disclosure claims made.”70 For example, the
65. In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 832 F.3d 718, 725 (7th Cir. 2016).
66. See House v. Akorn, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 3d 616, 623 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (applying Trulia
standard to reverse payment of mootness fee); Sanchez v. IXYS Corp., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
170332, *14 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2018) (“I adopt the ‘plainly material’ standard here.”); In re Hatteras
Fin., Inc., S’holder Litig., 286 F. Supp. 3d 727, 731, 740 (M.D.N.C. 2017) (approving a settlement
that resulted in supplemental disclosures that were “technically material” but of “marginal”
benefit to the class, and approving fee award of $350,790); Bushansky v. Remy Int’l, Inc., 262 F.
Supp. 3d 742, 746 (S.D. Ind. 2017) (dismissing proposed settlement); Malone v. CST Brands, Inc.,
No. SA–16–CA–0955–FB, 2016 WL 8258791, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2016) (denying motion for
preliminary injunction); In re CytRx Corp. Stockholder Derivative Litig., No. CV 14-6414-GHK
(PJWx), 2016 WL 6571265, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2016) (rejecting motion to set aside judgment).
67. 148 A.D.3d 146, 159–60 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017). But see City Trading Fund v. Nye, 59 Misc.
3d 477, 494 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018) (concluding that this standard did not require award of a mootness
fee for disclosures that were of no value). In Maryland, a court held that the courts will not award
mootness fees for corrective disclosures unless the original litigation was “meritorious when
filed.” Dexter v. ZAIS Fin. Corp., No. 24-C-16-004740, 2016 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 11, at *11–12 (Md.
Cir. Ct. Dec. 8, 2016).
68. 129 A.3d at 896–97.
69. Id. at 897.
70. Steven Epstein, Scott B. Luftglass & Gail Weinstein, A Post-Trulia Success Story of
Disclosure-Based Settlement, LAW360 (Apr. 12, 2016, 10:34 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
782927/a-post-trulia-success-story-of-disclosure-based-settlement [https://perma.cc/YAG2-A4L6].
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Chancery Court in Xoom awarded counsel a $50,000 mootness fee and
concluded that a disclosure that was merely “helpful” could nonetheless
justify a fee award in the context of a voluntary dismissal rather than
a settlement.71
Notably, however, Delaware has a specific procedure for the
oversight of mootness fee payments. Payment of a mootness fee in
connection with the voluntary dismissal of a proposed class action in
Delaware requires notice to the putative class and court approval.72 The
Delaware courts have subjected mootness fees to careful scrutiny, at
least in some cases,73 and on occasion have denied plaintiffs’
applications for mootness fees.74
Outside of Delaware, the process has not developed in
accordance with the prediction of the Peppercorn article—that federal
courts would scrutinize the resolution of merger litigation in the same
manner as the Delaware courts.75 As noted above, several federal courts
have applied the Trulia standard to disclosure-only settlements.76
However, with one exception discussed below,77 the federal courts have
not imposed the same scrutiny on mootness fee payments. Instead, it
has become common for plaintiffs to dismiss their complaints
voluntarily and then negotiate privately with the target company for
payment of a mootness fee without seeking court approval of that fee.78
As a result, attorneys’ fees in mootness payments in federal court cases
71. In re Xoom Corp. Stockholder Litig., No. 11263-VCG, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 117, at *10,
*15 (Del. Ch. Aug. 4, 2016).
72. See In re Harman Int’l Indus., Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 13001-CB, 2016 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 291, at *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 22, 2016) (retaining jurisdiction for the purpose of resolving
plaintiffs’ fee application following voluntary dismissal); In re Zalicus Inc. Stockholders Litig., No.
9602-CB, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 15, at *3 (Jan. 16, 2015) (reasoning that “notice of the joint
application must be given to the putative class because of ‘the risk of buy off’ presented by the
proposed fee”) (quoting In re Advanced Mammography Sys., Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 14831, 1996
Del. Ch. LEXIS 132, at *2 (Oct. 30, 1996)).
73. See, e.g., In re Xoom, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 117, at *10, *14–15 (finding that a mootness
fee was appropriate when the disclosure provided some benefit to stockholders).
74. See, e.g., In re Zalicus, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 15, at *3, *5 (denying mootness fee because
notice of the fee was not given to the putative class of stockholders). The approach in other state
courts varies. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
75. See Fisch et al., supra note 14, at 612.
76. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 111–112 and accompanying text.
78. It appears that plaintiffs, at least in some cases, were able to employ this same process
in Delaware. In In re Harman Int’l Indus., Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 13001-CB, 2016 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 291, at *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 22, 2016), for example, the court issued an order granting plaintiffs’
request for voluntary dismissal and expressly retaining jurisdiction for the purpose of determining
the plaintiffs’ fee application. Subsequently, however, the defendants agreed to pay plaintiffs’
counsel a fee of $195,000, and the amount of that fee does not appear to have been submitted to
the court for approval. See Exhibit A to Stipulated [Proposed] Order Closing the Case at 3, In re
Harman Int’l Indus., Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 13001-CB (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 2017) (indicating
agreed-upon fee and stating that the court had not determined the reasonableness of the fee).
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are not generally disclosed by the parties. Based on our earlier research,
median mootness fees ranged from $200,000 to $450,000 over the period
2014 to 2017.79 Our more recent conversations with attorneys suggest
that these values may have declined to a range of $50,000 to $150,000,
depending on the negotiation between the attorneys involved.
Because mootness fees are paid in connection with cases that are
voluntarily dismissed prior to class certification, federal courts have
almost uniformly failed to oversee, approve, or even require disclosure
of these fees. This lack of federal court supervision, and the dynamic
which has developed post-Trulia, is why merger litigation rates remain
at high levels (and why these cases have moved from Delaware to the
federal courts). Although the mootness fee dynamic appears to have
reduced the size of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees, it has thus far permitted
them to achieve a result similar to what used to be available in
Delaware, except without the formal global release.
Several cases have grappled with the issue of whether the
federal courts have the power to oversee the dismissal and mootness fee
dynamic. In Berg v. Akorn, Inc., plaintiffs argued that, because the case
was voluntarily dismissed prior to class certification, the federal court
lacked jurisdiction to review the fee award.80 Notably, the FRCP do not
explicitly require judicial approval of a voluntary dismissal if a case has
not yet been certified as a class action.81 In Akorn, however, another
shareholder moved to intervene, arguing that the payment of the
mootness fee injured the interests of other shareholders.82 Similarly,
the court in Rosenfeld v. Time, Inc. concluded that the voluntary
dismissal of a complaint prior to class certification does not constitute
an adjudication, reasoning that, as a result, the court did not even have
jurisdiction under the PSLRA to evaluate whether Rule 11 sanctions
are warranted.83 These limitations have not just limited judicial
scrutiny of mootness fee payments; in most cases, the courts have not
even required that such payments be disclosed.

79. Cain et al., supra note 1, at 625 tbl.3. This is consistent with the information reported in
the popular press. See McLaughlin & McGovern, supra note 20 (reporting that “[m]ore recently,
median mootness fees are closer to $250,000”).
80. See No. 17 C 5016, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192278, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 2017)
(reporting that plaintiffs filed a document with the court reporting that “Defendants have agreed
to provide Plaintiffs with a single payment of $322,500 in attorneys’ fees and expenses to resolve
any and all Fee Claims, and thus there are no Fee Claims to be adjudicated by the Court”).
81. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (“The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class—or a class
proposed to be certified for purposes of settlement—may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or
compromised only with the court’s approval.”).
82. See 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192278, at *4–5.
83. No. 17cv9886 (DLC), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148394, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2018).
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Moreover, the courts’ failure to require disclosure of the
existence and amount of mootness fees raises the possibility that
plaintiffs’ attorneys are receiving mootness fees for valueless
disclosures or disclosures that were not causally related to the filing of
the complaint. 84 Indeed, it is hard to believe that the disclosures made
in connection with mootness fees are more valuable than those that
were previously made in connection with disclosure-only settlements
pursuant to court oversight, many of which were found to be of little or
no value.85 One indicator that this is the case is that if plaintiffs’
attorneys had valuable cases, they would likely bring them in Delaware
courts, which have historically awarded higher attorneys’ fees in
meritorious cases.
Although the size of the mootness fee payment in any particular
case seems relatively small, mootness fees impose real costs on the
judicial system and on companies. We can use the data from Table 2 to
estimate the total direct dollar cost of mootness fees in merger
litigation. Taking the number of merger litigation cases filed annually
and multiplying this number of cases by the percentage of cases where
mootness fees are paid,86 we can calculate the annual number of cases
where such fees are paid. We can then multiply this value by the
median mootness payments discussed above87 and arrive at an
estimate. For example, in 2017, we have 135 deal cases, of which 65%
resulted in a mootness fee payment, or approximately 88 cases. If we
use our data on mootness fees, the median mootness fee payment was
$265,000 per case.88 Doing the math, the estimated (lower bound) for

84. To the extent that target boards are agreeing to pay attorneys’ fees for litigation that has
not provided a benefit to the target company shareholders, they are arguably wasting corporate
assets. A waste analysis in the context of mootness fees differs in an important way from the
analysis of disclosure-only settlements because the defendant has not received the consideration
of a release from future litigation. Because the dismissal only reaches the individual claims of the
filing shareholder (claims that would not be cost-effective to litigate on a standalone basis), other
shareholders are not barred from filing a similar complaint and raising identical issues. It is thus
questionable whether the justification of litigation settlement and deterrence is an appropriate
defense to a waste claim. See generally In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 748–
49 (Del. Ch. 2005) (detailing the standard of waste under Delaware law).
85. See Fisch et al., supra note 14, at 615 (concluding that, because disclosure-only
settlements do not have a demonstrable effect on shareholder voting, they “do not produce a
corporate benefit”).
86. This number provides a lower bound on the number of cases in which mootness fees are
paid because there may be some unreported mootness fee payments that we were unable to
identify.
87. See discussion supra note 79 and accompanying text.
88. Cain et al., supra note 1, at 625 tbl.3. As we note below, this figure may be higher than
the mootness fee amounts currently paid.
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total mootness fees in 2017 would be $23.32 million.89 While this
number may seem small in comparison to the total dollar value of the
deals being completed, it is not insignificant.
B. The Problem of Mootness Fees
The lack of oversight, the continuing prevalence of merger
litigation, and the payment of attorneys’ fees in mootness fee cases all
raise troubling issues. We discuss these issues in this Section, including
the risk of blackmail litigation and the lack of transparency. We
conclude by discussing whether the current mootness fee review
standards in both state and federal court, to the extent they exist, are
workable.
1. Risk of Blackmail Litigation
The primary concerns with mootness fee litigation are related to
those involving disclosure-only settlements. Prior to Trulia, a
substantial number of merger cases were settled for additional so-called
corrective disclosures.90 From the defendant’s perspective, the primary
virtue of a settlement was that it resulted in a global release precluding
further litigation challenges to the merger.91 In effect, the plaintiffs’
attorneys were selling a form of insurance, which allowed the deal
parties to obtain a release from all breach of fiduciary duty claims as
well as any other claims arising from the transaction. This was a
valuable right, and the defendants were willing to pay for it.
For the settlement to have value then, it required that the
plaintiff class be certified, at least for settlement purposes. As a result,
the settlement and fee award were subject to review in Delaware by the
court under the substantial benefit test or, in federal court,
FRCP 23(e).92 The court thus had some oversight of the process, and
would in many instances refuse to approve the settlement if the benefit
89. Of course, this value is highly sensitive to changes in the assumptions used in the
calculations, but even at $100,000 per case on average, the amount is $8.8 million per year in costs.
From conversations with practitioners, we believe that the $235,000 figure is closer to the norm
and understates the average amounts paid.
90. See Fisch et al., supra note 14, at 572 (indicating this was the case for 60% of
transactions).
91. See, e.g., In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 892 (Del. Ch. 2016) (discussing
defendants’ motivations for agreeing to disclosure only settlements).
92. See, e.g., In re Sauer-Danfoss Inc. S’holders Litig., 65 A.3d 1116, 1141 (Del. Ch. 2011)
(reviewing request for attorneys’ fees and awarding $75,000 fee on the basis that “minimal fees
[are appropriate] when deal litigation confers minimal benefits”); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2)(C)(iii)
(requiring the court to consider, inter alia, “the terms of any proposed award of attorney’s fees”
before approving any proposed settlement or dismissal of class).
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was not apparent. In some prominent cases, including in In re Rural
Metro Corp. Stockholders Litigation,93 other plaintiffs’ law firms
intervened and took control of the case to prosecute more valuable
substantive claims.94 This court-supervised process eventually
culminated in the Trulia decision, in which the court determined that
many disclosure-only settlements provided little benefit to the class and
held that, in such cases, no fee award was appropriate.95 Importantly,
by imposing meaningful judicial scrutiny on proposed disclosure-only
settlements, Trulia limited the potential for plaintiffs’ attorneys to
exercise a form of blackmail by filing weak cases that defendants could
not litigate on a cost-effective basis.
Because mootness fee cases outside of Delaware are not subject
to the same judicial scrutiny, they too raise the potential for a form of
blackmail. More explicitly, although the plaintiffs’ law firm can hold out
the prospect of litigating the issue of whether the target’s disclosure is
sufficient, the prototypical mootness dismissal involves a case in which
there is no reasonable prospect of identifying a disclosure deficiency,
and the only rationale for payment is that it is less costly for the
defendants to pay the mootness fee than to challenge the complaint on
the merits.96 In other words, as the City Trading Fund v. Nye court put
it, “The very point of the lawsuit was simply to get paid—by the
shareholders—to go away. This is a pernicious motive for lawsuit.”97
In conversations with defense and plaintiffs’ attorneys, both
report that this dynamic appears to be driving the payment of mootness
fees. The fact that these cases are overwhelmingly brought by a small
handful of non–top-tier plaintiffs’ law firms, firms that are not
commonly involved in litigating cases that result in substantial
recoveries to the plaintiff class, is consistent with this dynamic. These
firms are well-known to the defense bar and their appearance on the
complaint signals to the defense bar that the mootness fee dance is to
begin.
This situation is exacerbated by the lack of judicial oversight in
federal courts. If the plaintiffs’ attorneys receive a fee in cases in which
their efforts do not provide a benefit, they lack any incentive to limit
litigation to cases involving truly problematic disclosures. Instead,
93. 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014).
94. Joel Edan Friedlander, How Rural/Metro Exposed the Systemic Problem of Disclosure
Settlements, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 877, 890–91 (2016).
95. See Trulia, 129 A.3d at 895, 907.
96. At least one defense counsel has informed us that some repeat buyers have refused to pay
this fee, preferring to litigate. As one might expect, after the first assertion of this right,
subsequent transactions have not been met with mootness fee demands.
97. City Trading Fund v. Nye, 59 Misc. 3d 477, 513 n.26 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018).
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plaintiffs’ firms continue to file these cases, expecting them to result in
a quick resolution and fee payment. This pattern is readily apparent in
our data.
2. Lack of Transparency
Our second objection to mootness fees is the lack of
transparency. In our empirical data collection, we found that payments
of mootness fees were rarely disclosed and, outside of Delaware,
mootness fees were virtually never disclosed in court documents,98
although they sometimes appeared in a press release or corporate filing
with the SEC. Because of the lack of transparency, it is uncertain in
many cases whether a mootness fee is even paid. For example, in some
cases, disclosure is made with specific reference to mooting a pending
complaint without stating whether a mootness fee will be paid. In other
cases, there is only supplemental disclosure with a subsequent
dismissal but no mention of attempting to moot the pending case. In a
third set of cases, there is no supplemental disclosure and no record of
a mootness fee paid, simply a dismissal.
For example, on August 10, 2018, Radisys filed a proxy
statement in connection with a proposed merger with Reliance
Industries.99 Plaintiffs filed a complaint in federal court on August 17,
2018, alleging disclosure violations.100 On August 28, that complaint
was voluntarily dismissed, and Radisys filed an 8-K announcing that
the dismissals had been made following supplemental disclosures and
that plaintiffs’ counsel “stated their intent to seek mootness fees from
RSYS.”101 Neither the court docket nor Radisys’s corporate disclosures
provide any additional information as to whether a mootness fee was
subsequently paid and, if so, the amount of that fee.102
98. Also, as stated in Trulia, Delaware requires that mootness fees be disclosed to
shareholders. Trulia, 129 A.3d at 898. This disclosure may take the form of an 8-K filing. See, e.g.,
VAALCO Energy, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Apr. 26, 2016) (disclosing mootness fee).
When the practice of dismissal coupled with payment of a mootness fee initially developed, it was
the norm to disclose that a fee was being paid as well as the amount of the fee. The practice has
now changed, and mootness fees are rarely disclosed.
99. Radisys
Corp.,
Proxy
Statement
(Schedule
14A)
(Aug.
10,
2018),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/873044/000119312518246139/d502287ddefm14a.htm
[https://perma.cc/XHY5-5VGC].
100. Plaintiffs also filed a state court complaint, which was similarly dismissed. Radisys Corp.,
Current Report (Form 8-K) (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/873044/000087304418000097/a082918mergerlitigation.htm [https://perma.cc/MH6Y-6PUT].
101. Id.
102. U.S. District Court District of Oregon (Portland (3)) Civil Docket for Case #: 3:18-cv01525-SI, Shemali v. Radisys Corp., No. 3:18-cv-01525-SI (D. Or. Aug. 28, 2018),
http://securities.stanford.edu/filings-documents/1067/RC00_15/2018817_f02k_18CV01525.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K7NE-3ZDT].
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A transparent process would require disclosure of these fees both
to the court and in a public filing. Disclosure would provide an
opportunity for affected stockholders to step in and object, thereby
offering the possibility of an adversarial process even in a case in which
the target board is unwilling to defend against the complaint.103
Disclosures also provide a level of court oversight which ensures
the integrity of this process and interrupts the current blackmail
dynamic of mootness fees. This principle applies even if the costs—
anywhere from approximately $5 million to $25 million per year—are
dismissed as relatively trivial. In addition, oversight allows for court
intervention to ensure that an actual benefit is being provided in these
circumstances. As we discuss in the next Section, we believe that courts
should be more rigorous in the level of oversight they provide.
3. The Standard in Mootness Cases Is Unworkable
Judicial oversight of mootness fee applications does not,
however, fully address the problem. Remember that the standard, at
least as annunciated in Xoom, is that a mootness fee can be awarded “if
the disclosure provides some benefit to stockholders, whether or not
material to the vote.”104 The problem with this standard is that it
appears to be contrary to the long precedent on disclosure and
materiality as set forth in the federal securities law, starting with TSC
Industries v. Northway, Inc.105 Critically, it rewards plaintiffs for filing
complaints in cases in which there is no violation of the law—because
section 14(a) imposes liability only for “material” disclosure violations.
Awarding a mootness fee for disclosures that provide minimal
value to the plaintiff class—“tell me more” disclosures in the words of
the Nye court—is both a low standard and judicially unmanageable.106
As the court observed in Nye, “Since companies are only legally required
to disclose all material facts in connection with a merger, every single
proxy will surely omit at least some immaterial fact that might be of
some benefit to the shareholders.”107 Consequently, providing a fee
award for any cases that secure a disclosure that is immaterial yet
103. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Time, Inc., No. 17cv9886 (DLC), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148394
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2018); Berg v. Akorn, Inc., No. 17 C 5016, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192278 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 21, 2017).
104. In re Xoom Corp. Stockholder Litig., 2016 Del Ch. LEXIS 117, at *10 (Aug. 4, 2016).
105. 426 U.S. 438, 459 (1976) (“The general standard of materiality that we think best
comports with the policies of Rule 14a-9 is as follows: An omitted fact is material if there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how
to vote.”).
106. City Trading Fund v. Nye, 59 Misc. 3d 477, 513 n.26 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018).
107. Id.
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provides some benefit “incentivizes a lawsuit in connection with every
single merger.”108 Information that is not legally required should not be
the basis of a fee award.
III. MERGER DISCLOSURE ISSUES SHOULD BE A MATTER OF
FEDERAL LAW AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
SHOULD ADDRESS MOOTNESS FEES
A. The Case for Federal Oversight
The fundamental question underlying judicial review of
mootness fees is whether this should be a matter for a state or federal
court. As discussed above, two of us argued in the Peppercorn article
that federal courts rather than state courts should police merger
disclosure.109 We based our arguments on the core competencies of the
federal courts and the copious amount of federal law on this issue.
Succinctly, the federal courts have an eighty-five–year history of
regulating and policing securities disclosure. This has supplied a robust
body of case law concerning the appropriate standards of disclosure.
The SEC has adopted an enforcement and review process that also
includes rulemaking and guidance to issuers on the proper scope and
level of disclosure. The federal rules have also more directly engaged
with issues surrounding frivolous lawsuits. Indeed, the PSLRA was
adopted to police these suits, and both the SEC and the Supreme Court
have articulated the standards behind Rule 10b-5, Rule 14(a), and other
disclosure liability rules, including the requirements of scienter and
materiality. In this regard, Trulia can be seen as an adoption of that
principle. Trulia asserted that materiality as annunciated by the
federal courts should be the guiding standard for regulating disclosureonly litigation.110 It was a statement that these standards would govern
when the state court decided the validity of a settlement. Some federal
courts have adopted Trulia’s precepts. For example, in In re Walgreen
Co. Stockholder Litigation, Judge Richard Posner adopted the Trulia
standard for the Seventh Circuit.111 He wrote that these settlements
should be rejected unless the disclosure was “plainly material.”112
Trulia’s standard has also been adopted in other courts.113
108. Id.
109. See Fisch et al., supra note 14.
110. In re Trulia Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898–99 (Del. Ch. 2016).
111. In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 832 F.3d 718, 725 (7th Cir. 2016).
112. Id.
113. See In re Subway Footlong Sandwich Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 869 F.3d 551, 557
(7th Cir. 2017); see also Bushansky v. Remy Int’l, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 3d 742, 754 (S.D. Ind. 2017).
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Walgreen was decided in the context of FRCP 23 and the
requirements set out thereunder for judicial review of class action
settlements. FRCP 23, as currently written, does not apply to mootness
fees because the case is dismissed prior to class certification. As a result,
courts must find an alternative basis for overseeing the mootness fee
payment.
In the recent Akorn decision, the court concluded that it could
exercise its “inherent authority to rectify the injustice that occurred as
a result [of the dismissal and mootness fee payment].”114 In Akorn,
plaintiffs filed a motion for entry of stipulation and voluntary dismissal.
A supporting document indicated that the parties had agreed to an
attorneys’ fee payment of $322,500.115 The parties then argued to the
court that the “matter is fully resolved and no further issues remain in
dispute, and, there being no reason for the Court to retain jurisdiction
over this matter, the case should be closed for all purposes.”116
A shareholder sought to intervene to object to the requested fee
award on the basis that the case was “part of a ‘racket,’ pursued ‘for the
sole purpose of obtaining fees for the plaintiffs’ counsel.’ ”117 In an
opinion issued on June 24, 2019, the judge in Akorn ordered that the
plaintiffs’ attorneys return the fee award.118 The judge noted that this
was not a request for approval of a class action settlement. Nonetheless,
the court cited Walgreen for the proposition that “a class action that
seeks only worthless benefits for the class should be dismissed out of
hand.”119 The court then ordered the fees returned, stating:
The quick settlements obviously took place in an effort to avoid the judicial review this
decision imposes. This is the “racket” described in Walgreen, which stands the purpose of
Rule 23’s class mechanism on its head; this sharp practice “must end.” Plaintiffs’ cases
should have been “dismissed out of hand.”120

Akorn is important because it shows that a court can use its
inherent equitable authority to police the payment of a mootness fee.121
114. House v. Akorn, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 3d 616, 623 (N.D. Ill. 2019).
115. Berg v. Akorn, Inc., No. 17 C 5016, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192278, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
21, 2017).
116. Id. (quoting Stipulation and Proposed Order Closing Case for All Purposes at 6, Berg,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192278 (No. 17 C 5016)).
117. Id. (quoting the record).
118. Akorn, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 623.
119. Id. at 619 (quoting In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 832 F.3d 718, 724 (7th Cir.
2016)).
120. Id. at 623 (citations omitted) (quoting Walgreen, 832 F.3d at 724).
121. See supra notes 105–108 and accompanying text. See also Pearson v. Target Corp., 893
F.3d 980, 982 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting that counsel and parties should not be permitted to “leverage”
the class mechanism “for a purely personal gain”). As of the publication date of this Article, the
plaintiffs in Akorn are appealing the district court’s decision to the Seventh Circuit on the grounds
that “[s]ince there was no longer a case pending before [the judge], and since a federal judge’s
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The court in Akorn did not rely on the PSLRA or general disclosure
precedent. Although Akorn offers a path for courts to apply the
Walgreen standard to mootness fees, the Akorn court’s decision was only
possible because the parties had disclosed the payment of a mootness
fee and because an objector sought to intervene, triggering the court
decision. In most cases, neither the court nor potential objectors are
aware that a mootness fee has been paid, and no such objection is ever
raised. This is why, in the next Section, we propose an amendment to
the FRCP to expressly permit the review conducted by the Akorn court.
B. Amendment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
We propose that the federal courts should follow Delaware’s
approach and require both disclosure and judicial approval of mootness
fee payments. We recommend that the federal courts require that any
proposed mootness fee be reported to the court when there is a
voluntary dismissal of a proposed class action. The court should also be
required to approve that payment, even if the class has not been
certified.122 Finally, we recommend that the defendant corporation be
required to file a Form 8-K or make another public disclosure, prior to
the judicial hearing, alerting investors to any request by plaintiffs’
counsel for a mootness fee, the position of the board of directors with
respect to the request, and the amount of the proposed payment.123
We believe that the federal courts could adopt these
requirements on their own, as the court in Akorn did.124 If federal courts
choose to do so, they could limit these requirements to the context of
class action merger litigation.

authority to issue orders depends (with immaterial exceptions) on the existence of a case, [the
judge’s] order was void.” Joint Consolidated Opening Brief And Required Short Appendix For
Plaintiffs-Appellants Shaun A. House And Demetrios Pullos, House v. Akorn, Inc., Nos. 1:17-cv05018 and 1:17-cv-05026 (7th Cir. Oct. 16, 2019) (quoting Smith v. Potter, 513 F.3d 782–83 (7th
Cir. 2008)). We note that an amendment to the FRCP would address any potential ambiguity on
this issue.
122. We note that merger litigation filed as a derivative suit is already subject to FED. R. CIV.
P. 23.1(c)’s requirement that any derivative case can be “settled, voluntarily dismissed, or
compromised only with the court’s approval.” This provision is designed to permit objectors to
“question the overall fairness of a settlement and to prevent a secret settlement in which the
plaintiff and his attorney receive a clandestine payment from the defendant.” JAMES D. COX &
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX & HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS 988 (2d ed. 2003). It seems inequitable that
plaintiffs can circumvent these judicial protections merely by recasting a derivative complaint as
one that purports to be a class action.
123. Although the federal courts could potentially order such disclosures based on their power
to protect the shareholders of the defendant corporation, these requirements are arguably better
implemented through SEC rulemaking.
124. At least one of the complaints in the Akorn action styled itself as a class action. Complaint
at 1, Akorn, 385 F. Supp. 3d 616 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (No. 1:17-cv-05018).
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On the other hand, the potential for plaintiffs’ counsel to extract
mootness fee payments in exchange for voluntarily dismissing frivolous
complaints is not limited to merger cases. As a result, we suggest that
it may be desirable for the Federal Rules Committee to consider
incorporating these requirements into FRCP 23. To address the
potential for plaintiffs’ counsel to use a putative class action to obtain a
mootness fee without obtaining meaningful recovery for the plaintiff
class, we propose that FRCP 23 be amended to require disclosure and
court approval if counsel seeks a fee award or other payment in
connection with the voluntary dismissal of a proposed class action, even
if that dismissal occurs prior to class certification.125
Our proposed amendment to FRCP 23 takes the following form:
FRCP 23(e)(5)(B)(iii)
Unless approved by the court after a hearing, no payment or other
consideration may be provided in connection with the voluntary
dismissal of a proposed class action.
By providing notice and requiring judicial approval, the court
would be able to hear from objectors to the payment and determine if
the payments were justified under the appropriate legal standard, such
as the one provided in the Trulia case.126 Given the dubious nature of
the benefits to defendants of mootness fee payments, and the likelihood
that shareholders would object to the practice, we anticipate that
disclosure would substantially reduce defendants’ willingness to pay
mootness fees.127

125. As it currently stands, FED. R. CIV. P. 41 allows for voluntary dismissal without court
approval, subject to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). FED. R. CIV. P. 23 was amended recently in order to stop
a similar practice of objector blackmail, whereby an objector to a class action settlement would
intervene for nonmeritorious reasons to delay the closing of the settlement until the delay
pressured class counsel or the defendant to pay them to go away. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5)(B)-(C)
were added to require court approval of a payment “provided in connection with: (i) forgoing or
withdrawing an objection, or (ii) forgoing, dismissing, or abandoning an appeal.” This practice was
documented in Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Objector Blackmail?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1623 (2009).
The Standing Committee’s report to the Judicial Conference discusses these amendments. COMM.
ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2017), https://www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/2017-09-jcus-report_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2WC-6FK5] [hereinafter SUMMARY
OF JCC REPORT].
126. Alternatively, courts should issue standing orders in merger litigation cases requiring
that any payment of fees be reported to the court prior to payment.
127. We recognize that plaintiffs’ attorneys could attempt to style their cases as individual and
not class actions to avoid this rule. However, the commentary to the rule should specifically note
that an action providing class-wide benefits such as a disclosure settlement would be considered
covered by the Rule. We also believe that, to the extent plaintiffs’ counsel sought mootness fee
payments in a case not involving a class action, payment of a mootness fee could potentially
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Our proposal would align with both the purpose of FRCP 23 as
well as Delaware’s approach to the subject; specifically, it would
address the risk of nonmeritorious cases that are filed for the purpose
of attempting to extract a fee payment. We note that FRCP 23 was
previously amended to address similar concerns in connection with the
filing and subsequent withdrawal of objections to settlements. In 2017,
FRCP 23 was amended to require court approval for any payment to an
objector to a class settlement in connection with the objector’s
withdrawal of the objection. The rationale cited by the standing
committee was that “[a]lthough the payment may advance class
interests in a particular case, allowing payment perpetuates a system
that can encourage objections advanced for improper purposes.”128 A
rule requiring court approval of mootness fee payments would align
with this approach of preventing rent seeking through judicial
oversight of similar fee payments. It would also align with the
transparency and court-supervised process that FRCP 23 promotes.
Similarly, our proposal is consistent with Delaware law on the
subject. Delaware law specifically requires that the payment of a
mootness fee be accompanied by notice to shareholders to prevent “ ‘the
risk of buy off’ of plaintiffs’ counsel.”129 As explained in Trulia:
As the Court recently stated, “notice is appropriate because it provides the information
necessary for an interested person to object to the use of corporate funds, such as by
‘challeng[ing] the fee payment as waste in a separate litigation,’ if the circumstances
warrant.” In other words, notice to stockholders is designed to guard against potential
abuses in the private resolution of fee demands for mooted representative actions.130

To the extent federal courts do not impose this regime under
their inherent authority, as the Akorn court did, an amendment of
FRCP 23 would thus align with notions of transparency and
shareholder interests that are embedded in both the federal and
Delaware civil procedure rules.131 In this regard, we advocate that
Delaware further modify its standard to formalize the requirements of

constitute waste given the discrepancy between the payment and an individual plaintiff’s potential
interest in the litigation.
128. SUMMARY OF JCC REPORT, supra note 125, at 291.
129. In re Trulia Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898 (Del. Ch. 2016).
130. Id.
131. We note that, because our proposal extends to complaints that are filed as proposed class
actions but dismissed prior to certification, it could be understood as interfering with a litigant’s
right to voluntarily dismiss an individual claim. Our response is that, at least in merger litigation,
the purported justification for the mootness fee is the class-wide benefit in the form of
supplemental disclosures, and that a mootness fee would not be warranted absent that
justification. Because plaintiffs’ counsel is leveraging class status to obtain a fee payment, the
cases should be understood in those terms.
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notice to the court and judicial approval of mootness fees in proposed
class actions.
C. Revision of the Substantive Mootness Fee Standard
We also propose that courts in Delaware and elsewhere revise
the substantive standard for the approval of mootness fees and limit
that approval to cases in which the supplemental disclosures that have
the effect of rendering the litigation moot are clearly material under the
Trulia standard. Plaintiffs’ counsel should not be rewarded for
uncovering and correcting immaterial disclosure violations.
Elimination of the weakened standard for recovery of fee awards in
mootness cases would substantially reduce the frequency with which
litigation is filed that does not benefit the company or its shareholders.
We note that the Akorn court adopted this approach. Applying
Walgreen, the court determined that the relevant issue was whether the
supplemental disclosures requested in plaintiffs’ initial complaint were
“plainly material.”132 It then reviewed the additional disclosures to
determine whether they met this standard and concluded that they did
not.133
From a cost-benefit perspective, these simple changes would
undoubtedly be beneficial. As we estimated earlier, the direct costs of
mootness fees likely amounted to at least $23 million in 2017. Of course,
mootness litigation creates other significant indirect costs arising out of
the lack of transparency and the judicial time lost when trying to apply
the unworkable legal standard for adjudicating these cases. These costs
would all be saved by the rule change, although there might be some
offsetting increase in the effort associated with judicial review. If courts
adopt the Trulia standard, however, even these costs should quickly
decrease as fewer of these cases are filed.
Events in the Delaware courts subsequent to Trulia support our
proposal. As our analysis shows, weak merger cases migrated out of
Delaware after Trulia, but litigation in Delaware did not end. Instead,
as we discussed in Part I, plaintiffs’ lawyers continue to file lawsuits
raising meaningful challenges to mergers in Delaware. These cases
commonly involve allegations of conflict of interest, the focus of the
Delaware courts these days, and in large part they are litigated more
extensively and often result in substantial benefits for the plaintiff

132. House v. Akorn, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 3d 616, 622–23 (N.D. Ill. 2019).
133. Id.
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class.134 Most recently, In re Calamos Asset Management Stockholder
Litigation resulted in a settlement of $30 million.135
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we empirically analyze the latest development in
merger litigation: the mootness fee. We find that this type of disposition
now dominates merger litigation. In 2018, 83% of deals were subject to
litigation, and an average of 63% of these cases resulted in the payment
of a mootness fee. The rise of the mootness fee has resulted in the
demise of the disclosure-only settlement. It has also resulted in the
precipitous decline of merger litigation filed in Delaware; only 2% of
cases brought in 2018 involving Delaware-incorporated targets were
filed exclusively in Delaware, a remarkable decline from 57% of these
cases filed in 2015.
We argue that the rise of the mootness fee is not beneficial from
a capital markets perspective and is instead a form of blackmail in
which defendants pay mootness fees not on the merits but simply to
avoid vexatious litigation. This practice persists due to a lack of
transparency associated with mootness fee payments and the absence
of sufficient judicial oversight.
We conclude that change is needed. First, the migration of
disclosure-based merger litigation to federal courts is not the source of
the problem. Federal courts have core competencies in evaluating
disclosure claims, and they should apply those competencies to merger
litigation cases. However, federal courts should also adopt mechanisms
to ensure that mootness fees are rendered transparent to both the
courts and to shareholders. This transparency can be accomplished by
individual courts like the one in Akorn requiring the disclosure of
mootness fees or, alternatively, standardizing the requirement of
disclosure and court approval of mootness fees in merger litigation
through an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Second,
134. Examples include the settlements related to the buyouts of Examworks ($86.5 million),
FrontFour ($47 million), Good Technology ($52 million), and Starz ($92.5 million). See Joel
Friedlander, Confronting the Problem of Fraud on the Board, BUS. LAW. (forthcoming Winter
2019–2020)
(manuscript
at
37–40),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3359402&download=yes [https://perma.cc/U7SG-26ZV] (discussing the Good Technology and
Examworks settlements); Medley and FrontFour Reach Settlement Terms on Proposed Merger,
Postpone Shareholder Vote, DI WIRE (Apr. 9, 2019), https://thediwire.com/medley-frontfour-reachsettlement-terms-proposed-merger-postpone-shareholder-vote/ [https://perma.cc/GUM2-9FHJ];
Jeff Montgomery, Chancery OKs $92.5M Deal To End $4.4B Starz Merger Suit, LAW360 (Dec. 10,
2018),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1109603/chancery-oks-92-5m-deal-to-end-4-4b-starzmerger-suit [https://perma.cc/23SY-V6C4].
135. Stipulation and Agreement of Compromise and Settlement at 23, In re Calamos Asset
Mgmt., Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 2017-0058-JTL (Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 2019).
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we argue that in evaluating the proposed payment of a mootness fee in
cases involving supplemental merger disclosures, courts should reject
the Xoom standard, which does not require materiality but allows
payment of a mootness fee in cases in which the disclosures provide any
arguable benefit. Instead, the courts should condition the payment of
mootness fees on the correction of material disclosure violations.
Merger litigation has existed for decades, and challenges to
merger processes and disclosures have led to important reforms and, in
many cases, substantial recoveries for class members. The cases that
result in voluntary dismissals and the payment of mootness fees,
however, are not meritorious cases. Trulia reduced the impact and cost
of merger litigation challenges that do not produce meaningful value for
the plaintiff class by increasing judicial scrutiny of disclosure-only
settlements coupled with fee awards. It also resulted in the filing of
disclosure challenges where they belong—in federal court. A final step
is needed, subjecting mootness fees in federal court to the same scrutiny
imposed by the Trulia line of cases. Such a step would eliminate this
type of frivolous litigation altogether and finally end the era of
widespread merger litigation.

